As I write this in 2026, the world is becoming more multipolar, and I expect that trend to continue over the next decade through 2036.
In reality, it was this recent unipolar period that was historically anomalous. Starting from the end of World War II in 1945 and especially since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has existed as the world’s sole hyperpower. For the first time in history, telecommunications and industry connected the whole world, enabling a truly global reach.
Prior to that point, multipolarity was the norm. Even during the height of the Roman Empire nearly two millennia ago, there were other similarly powerful regions of the world, including the Han Dynasty and other Asian kingdoms and empires. That was at a time when distance truly mattered, and great powers could exist simultaneously with only limited contact.
The other side of this multipolar aspect of power was the multipolar nature of money. For thousands of years, it was gold and silver, along with lesser commodities, that served as money. There was no sovereign ledger big enough to serve the whole world, and so only nature’s decentralized ledger could suffice.
But in the age of telecommunications, as commerce and money began to flow at the speed of light in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, even gold wasn’t good enough. The United States dollar became the primary currency for cross-border lending and contract pricing, while the United States treasury bond became the primary reserve asset for central banks. People often point to the existence of prior reserve currencies, such as the British pound sterling or the Dutch gilder, but they weren’t the same thing as the dollar. They were proxies for metal, and gold itself was the real reserve currency in those eras. But during this unipolar hyperpower era, the free-floating dollar and its bond market surpassed the known market capitalization of gold and became by far the largest holding in sovereign reserves.
Many people viewed this unipolar era as the end of history, even though of course history never does end. China and India gradually recovered their economic might from the depths of colonialism and war that defined their 19th and 20th centuries, with China in particular becoming the world’s largest steel producer, electricity generator, and manufacturer now in the early 21st century. The United States, meanwhile, suffered from the Triffin dilemma: in order to maintain the world’s reserve currency, the nation must supply the world with units of its currency, which they do by running deficits. Those deficits, and the associated hollowing-out of industry that they contribute to, is what eventually weakens the trust in that currency.
Now, many of those in power in the United States no longer want the costs of issuing the reserve currency, though few would say it out loud. The imbalances have become too great. Meanwhile, the rest of the world doesn’t want their assets to be devalued or frozen, or their liabilities hardened, at the whim of Washington DC. There are no other sovereign entities willing and able to serve as the world’s ledger either, with all the trust that’s required and all the burdens it entails.
And so, here it is that we witness the gradual trend shift back toward multipolarity of money. Gold is the obvious first choice; it’s the only other liquid and divisible store of value that’s big enough. It’s still not fast enough, but nations see that they didn’t have to go as all-in on the dollar as they did. They can hold gold in lieu of treasuries for a bigger chunk of their savings than they have been doing in recent decades. It may have its flaws, but gold can’t be hacked, can’t be unliterally debased or frozen, and lasts forever.
The second choice is a boring but obvious one: diversification. In a world where there are a handful of major economic powers, nations can diversify their fiat currency exposures. They can hold a plurality of currencies and bonds at roughly equal proportion to the size of their trading partners and capital providers. That spreads out risk, both in terms of debasement and in terms of confiscation. The problem here is about network effects: liquidity begets more liquidity, and entities don’t want assets and liabilities denominated in different units, and so money naturally trends toward one wherever possible. A patchwork combination of gold and two or three major fiat currencies collectively serving as the world’s ledger is a workable one, but not an ideal one.
The third potential choice, still in its relative infancy, is Bitcoin. Nature provided slow but decentralized ledgers, sovereigns provided fast but centralized ledgers, and this third method now provides a ledger that is both decentralized and fast. The hyperpower unipolar world occurred at a time when transaction speeds could move at the speed of light, but final settlement could not. Fast global transactions (i.e. IOUs) only require Morse code over telegraph connections, which are very simple and of low bandwidth, while fast global settlements (i.e. irreversible transfers) require much higher bandwidth communications and hard encryption. Now that fast settlement exists at scale, the reliance on central intermediaries to bridge the gap between fast transactions and slow settlements can be reduced.
However, the challenge from this point on is twofold: security and network effects.
Bitcoin’s ultimate security has been questioned from its inception. Will its economic incentives keep it permissionless and decentralized indefinitely, or will it eventually gravitate toward centralized capture? Will its cryptographic assumptions continue to hold? And related to both of those questions: will it be able to gradually update over time despite its decentralization, so that it can remain functional and secure as the world’s computer infrastructure evolves underneath it? At only seventeen years of age, these questions are still unanswered, but those of us who invest in the asset and participate in development either directly or through the financing of development believe that Bitcoin is the best shot we have, and so we try to create the reality we want to see.
Bitcoin’s network effects are strong, but are still limited. These network effects, along with its simple and robust design, have been sufficient to keep it as the largest cryptocurrency for seventeen straight years since inception, with no true competitors anywhere in sight. However, when looking more broadly, it’s still a minnow in an ocean of sharks. The direct user base is in the low millions, in a world of billions. The market cap is in the low trillions of dollars in a global world of assets that has reached roughly a quadrillion dollars. And speaking of dollars, people use the largest and most liquid money as their unit of account, and that remains the dollar globally and other fiat currencies locally. It’s what people’s paychecks are denominated in, it’s what their business contracts refer to, and it’s what fulfills their liabilities.
In order to grow very large, Bitcoin by definition requires upward volatility. With upward volatility comes euphoria and leverage, which create the conditions for periods of downward volatility. This volatile adoption period, which inevitably takes decades as it chips into the existing network effects of the dollar and other large monies, limits its attractiveness both as a unit of account and as a near-term savings device. It serves as an investable asset, as long-term savings, and as the most unstoppable payment and settlement method for products and services that are otherwise denominated in more stable incumbent monies. Bitcoin’s fate during this adoption period rests on the vision of early adopters whose plans are measured in decades. The larger it becomes, the more stable it can be and the more it can function as an accounting unit and near-term savings, but getting there is a long journey.
To the extent that Bitcoin continues to remain strong in the face of security threats, and continues to chip into the incumbent monetary networks, the more attractive it becomes to individuals, corporations, and sovereigns. In 2036, I believe gold will still be desired, as there is a natural tendency to want to own physical, immortal things. And I believe the largest fiat currencies, troubled as they may be, will still be in widespread use: those trains have quite a while to run yet. If it’s successful, Bitcoin in 2036 would be larger than any stock, and would rival the largest currencies and metals in market size.
The biggest challenge to Bitcoin is not governments, not quantum computers, not rogue developers, and not other digital assets. Instead, the biggest challenge, the biggest risk, is us. The people. All people.
In 2036, war, corruption, and tyranny will still exist. However, it’s a question of ratios and numbers. People imagine that governments impose all of these things on us, when in reality that’s only partially true. The way it works in practice is that people ask for it.
There is a perceived balance between liberty and security. War and tyranny, and the centralized ledgers that fuel them, come not just out of human evil, but also from human fear. When people are afraid of invaders, plagues, technology, and competition over scarce resources, they turn to their leaders for protection. They give up some of their liberty as long as they perceive that they’re under the collective security umbrella, and that the power of the state will be directed at others rather than themselves. This can work for a time, but it breeds corruption. Power begets power, and eventually turns inward. State failures, when they inevitably occur, must be covered up. Critics of the state, whether from without or from within, must be silenced. When liberty is gone, that system which promised security eventually and ironically becomes the biggest threat to it.
People who criticize ubiquitous surveillance and bureaucratic overreach when wielded by their political opponents often turn around to embrace those tools as soon as their political allies are in power. It’s a short-sighted strategy, relying either on staying in power forever, or in the lack of foresight about how those tools will be given back to their opponents at some point, stronger than ever and ready to be used against them yet again.
If Bitcoin fails to catch on by 2036, I think it will be because humanity didn’t want it, or wasn’t ready for it. The technology itself is robust. Proof of work helps keep the network secure. Tight limits on bandwidth and storage help keep the network decentralized. Layers built on top of it help provide scaling and privacy. There is more work to do, but the foundation is already strong, open for business, and being used at scale. To the extent that major challenges arise, the network is upgradable whenever sufficient consensus is achieved.
In this latest bull/bear cycle, Bitcoin further separated itself from other cryptocurrencies, but failed to attract many new users. AI services caught on with the public far more quickly, leapfrogging Bitcoin in adoption, because people and businesses could see AI’s immediate benefits to them, while Bitcoin’s benefits were unclear to many who haven’t gone down a rabbit hole of research.
There are many stores of value to choose from, and volatility is painful. In order for Bitcoin to truly catch on, it will need to be because people value financial sovereignty. It will need to be because hundreds of millions of people, not just several million as we have now, appreciate the importance of self-custodied savings, permissionless payments, and financial privacy. Those collectively are the attributes that Bitcoin uniquely provides at scale.
Prior to Bitcoin, during this century of fast transactions but without fast settlements, governments could impose their control over the financial system in the background. By regulating the banks, they could surveil and contain activities to a significant degree without restricting almost any end-user directly. Thus, most people didn’t see any direct threats to their financial liberty. After Bitcoin, people can run open-source code, can transact without permission, and can hold liquid savings in their own custody. To the extent that governments are threatened by this, they can’t just impose restrictions on thousands of banks anymore; they have to impose restrictions on millions of end-users and developers.
The question is, now that technology has pulled the mask off, will enough people resist and push forward through frictions, or will they comply without protest and move backward?
We have the tools now, but will we use them? That’s the main question to answer for 2036.
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This piece is featured in the latest Print edition of Bitcoin Magazine, The 2036 Issue. We’re sharing it here as an early look at the ideas explored throughout the full issue.
